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Values, Crisis and Resistance: Prospects for Freedom Reconsidered
Spiros Gangas
This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction.
The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, 2
The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, domination within the cognitive, psychic and moral quandaries of narcissism. Against the psychoanalytical and sociological orthodoxies of his time, Fromm walks the theoretical tightrope between the instinctual and the societal within the socialized psyche, thus theorizing narcissism as a catch-all semiotic metaphor which weds the innermost recesses of the ordinary self with the various layers of the outer socio-political world, and yet does not collapse the former into the latter or vice versa. With the selfsame caution, Fromm's psychoanalytic imagination further allows for interpreting the self outside the mainstream, individual clinical setting, and as a broader cultural-anthropological category. Finally, whether with reference to the individual or the collective self, Fromm pays equal attention to the material efficacy of symbolic power and the symbolic efficacy of material power, as they associate with one another in the manner of a continuous dialectical becoming, also making central to such enquiry plentiful cases of explicit, physical violence.
His view of the multiple and multifarious ways in which innate narcissistic drives may correlate with mass evildoing should not be misread as a fatalistic apologia for modernity, nor as an outright condemnation of particular cohorts or individuals gone awry. Whereas, for example, Freud (1930 Freud ( /2002 prophesied the relapse of 'pre-Holocaust' civilization into barbarism by evoking what he saw as the ultimate impotence of any conceivable society fully and permanently to tame man's aggressive physiological and biological endowments, and whilst the mainstream Freudo-Marxists of the so-called 'Frankfurt School' 1 anchor their retrospective account of Nazism in personality traits inculcated by authoritarian right-wing families during early childhood (see Adorno et al., 1950) , Fromm shifts the blame to the grave politico-economic conditions which forced the overwhelming majority of Germans into authoritarian relations of dependency (see, for example, Fromm, 1941 (see, for example, Fromm, /1994 . Whatever remnants of psychologism one may manage to trace in Fromm's work, they hardly suffice to overshadow his sociological insights or to downgrade such insights to postmodernist elegies for the 'death of man'. ' [T] here are probably hundreds of Hitlers amongst us who would come forth if their historical hour arrived', he argues (Fromm, 1973 (Fromm, /1984 , and certainly millions who would willingly join the ranks in the face of 'psychological scarcity' (Fromm, 1949 (Fromm, /1986 ), but '[f] or Fromm, man is by no means dead: he has simply not yet reached adulthood ' (Ingleby, 2006: xx) . 2 And, paradoxically enough, the route out of infantile attachment to the irrational authority of others and the ensuing immoralities passes through man's own need for narcissistic relatedness. To help humanity reach its potential This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Please contact rights@palgrave.com if you have any queries regarding use of the file. 
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Some preliminary notes on Fromm's concept of man
Fromm believes that just as man is shaped by the form of social and economic organization in which he lives and works, man also affects and often even consolidates that organization in turn. The medium in which such dialectics take place, or else, the 'transmission belt between the economic structure of society and the prevailing ideas', is what Fromm terms the 'social character'. The social character is 'the essential nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group which has developed as the result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group' (Fromm, 1941 (Fromm, /1994 original emphasis) . As such, the content of the social character always pertains to the range of needs deeply rooted in the nature of man. For ideas to become powerful ideological forces, then, they have to respond directly to specific human needs prominent in a given social character; if not, they remain at best a stock of conscious convictions. Ultimately, the function of the social character is to maintain and enhance civil order by '[shaping] the energies of the members of society in such a way that their behaviour is not a matter of conscious decision as to whether or not to follow the social pattern, but one of wanting to act as they have to act and at the same time finding gratification in acting according to the requirements of the culture' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /2006 original emphasis) . In elaborating on the issue of needs, Fromm poses a socio-biological question: 'What kind of ties to the world, persons, and things, mustand can -man develop in order to survive, given his specific equipment and the nature of the world around him?' The answer is twofold. First, man 'has to provide for his material needs (food, shelter, etc.) and for the survival of the group in terms of procreation and protection of the young'. This Fromm terms 'the process of assimilation'. But, again, man 'could not remain sane even if he took care of all his material needs, unless he were able to establish some form of relatedness to others that allows him to feel "at home" and saves him from the experience of complete affective isolation and separateness ' (Fromm and Maccoby, 1970: 14) . Elsewhere Fromm also refers to happiness, rootedness and This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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The primordial need to have one's own needs satisfied derives from narcissism, an overarching state common to all humans, albeit variable in its particular objects or, indeed, morality. From the standpoint of self-preservation, 'one's own life is more important than that of another' (Fromm, 1995: 87) , whereas, from the standpoint of self-experience, '[one's] sense of identity exists in terms of . . . being identified with [a] group. He as a separate individual must be able to feel "I" ' (ibid.: 85) . Which of the two narcissistic needs will acquire primacy in the sense of greater urgency, and under which affective guises; who or what poses threats to corporeal survival and/or the identity; what comprises identity and which group appears preferable to the individual; the degree to which objective judgement is distorted and whether narcissism takes on a creative and benign or a destructive and malignant form -these are all matters dependent upon the social character predominant at a given historical moment.
It is through this open-ended lens that Fromm proceeds to dismiss the 'naïve optimism of the eighteenth century', as this is reflected in Marx's 'romantic idealization of the working class'. 'The famous statement at the end of the Communist manifesto that the workers "have nothing to lose but their chains", contains a profound psychological error', Fromm explains. 'With their chains they have also to lose all those irrational needs and satisfactions which were originated whilst they were wearing the chains' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /2006 . The aim here is to draw attention to the prior macro-social awakening of those irrational forces in man which, on the one hand, make him afraid of freedom, and, on the other hand, produce his lust for power and destructiveness, albeit by subjugation under higher external powers, be it the state of a leader, natural law, the past or God. This development Fromm describes under the rubric of 'authoritarian character', the person who 'admires authority and tends to submit to it, but at the same time . . . wants to be an authority himself and have others submit to him ' (Fromm, 1941 ' (Fromm, /1994 .
It follows that, if the theoretical vision of a better society is ever to be effectuated, if the biblical urge to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' is ever to find its concrete expression in universal reality, then political and economic reforms should be accompanied by a new moral orientation. The former cannot but be utterly futile in the absence of the latter. And this moral orientation, according to Fromm, is none other than an unyielding commitment to humanism. Conceived in abstracto, his ideal man is This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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In what follows, I explicate Fromm's conceptualization of narcissism, of the authoritarian and revolutionary characters, and of the ways in which they may all relate to one another.
The paradox of narcissism
In conceptualizing narcissism, Fromm takes the lead from Freud and the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary narcissism' in particular. Primary narcissism, on the one hand, is that condition whereby the libido of the newborn infant is wholly directed to the self, and does not extend to objects in the outside world (Freud, 1914 (Freud, /1986 . Every infant, in other words, is born into a state of narcissism, in the belief that the whole world revolves around it, indeed, that the world is it. All people, it follows, are bound to harbour in a secret corner of their psyche some narcissistic delusions of grandeur, delusions which may be reduced to the socially accepted minimum, yet never fully disappear. Narcissistic delusions may nurse exaggeratedly favourable evaluations of the self (or parts of it, for that matter), coupled with extreme anxieties of being found weak and worthless. Such states Freud describes in pathological terms, as manifestations of 'secondary narcissism'.
Although a devoted advocate of the Freudian 'dynamic concept of human behaviour; that is, the assumption that highly charged forces motivate behaviour, and that behaviour can be understood and predicted only by understanding these forces' (Fromm, 1964: 65, original (Fromm, 1995: 87) . Fromm's self-imposed task is, instead, to deconstruct and reconstruct the narcissism of 'normal' individuals, particularly the dynamic social processes by which the narcissistic character becomes typical of many 'normal' people in their symbiotic relatedness.
Before continuing, it is necessary to point out the basic constitutive elements of the intense narcissism experienced by normal individuals, particularly in light of the arguments which will follow. Narcissists, according to Fromm, have the tendency to transform into psychic facts not just positive forms of self-regard (for example, intelligence, physical prowess), but also 'qualities about which normally a person would not This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, be proud, such as [the] capacity to be afraid and thus to foretell danger' (Fromm, 1964: 71) . In response to perceived ego threats, narcissists end up turning others into what is often referred to in psychoanalytical jargon as idealized or archaic 'self-objects'. Narcissists, that is, deny others their unique individuality, fuse them into their own extended self-conception and employ them as mere mirrors of their own exhibitionistic being -mirrors that serve but constantly to protect, maintain, or enhance the narcissists' self-esteem (see further Kohut, 1986) . The most dangerous result of intense narcissistic attachment is the distortion of rational judgment. It is not simply that the object of narcissism is thought to be valuable because 'it is me or mine', nor just that the 'extraneous ("not me") world is inferior, dangerous, immoral'; that the person is convinced that there is no bias in the judgment 'leads to a severe distortion of his capacity to think and to judge, since this capacity is blunted again and again when he deals with himself and what is his' (Fromm, 1964: 73-74) . Of self-defensive necessity, narcissists treat any type of criticism as unfair, hostile and worthy of furious reaction. Here we find what is sometimes paraded as a psychological truism: that narcissists are not incapable of loving others, yet they are incapable of loving another as another person. But is not this the very proof that '[t]he narcissist cannot love' himself, either? That 'at most he desires himself'? That 'he is egotistic, "selfish", "full of himself" ' (Fromm, 1995: 87) ? Indeed, Fromm takes the argument to the end. As a result of unproductiveness, he argues, '[t]he selfish person does not love himself too much, but too little; in fact, he hates himself'. Much as he may appear to care for himself, he tries in vain to 'cover up and compensate for his failure to care for his real self ' (Fromm, 1949 ' (Fromm, /1986 . This is by no means to say that narcissism should be equated with selfishness or egotism. To be sure, there is some resemblance between the concepts in that they both imply an inability to love oneself and others, as well as a desire to satisfy exclusively the ever-greedy self. But, says Fromm, whilst the narcissist 'cannot know himself, for he is in his own way, because he is so full of himself that neither he himself, nor the world, nor God can become the object of his knowing' (ibid.), the selfish or egotistical person does not necessarily over-evaluate his own subjective processes, nor does he always lack awareness of the world outside (Fromm, 1964) .
To complicate things further, personal narcissism is often transformed into group or social narcissism. The functions, biological as well as sociological, of the transformation are discussed further below. At any rate, group narcissism is not as recognizable as its individual
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Bloody wars have often been fought between neighbours and former allies under such banners as equality and justice, yet, from a psychoanalytic perspective, banners do not always signify the primordial motivating force behind the decision to join the ranks or the act of killing on the battlefield. We might argue, instead, with Freud, that the loss of cultural differences in close circles, and of the attendant power differentials -in short, 'the narcissism of minor differences' -, represents itself a threat as grave as to trigger irreparably explosive situations. Not the grand 'metanarrative' schema of Kierkegaardian equality, but its secular alternative that is the psychic lure of inequality is what drives the narcissist to kill his neighbour. 'It is always possible to bind quite large numbers of people together in love, provided that others are left out as targets for aggression ' (Freud, 1930 ' (Freud, /2002 see also Blok, 2001) .
Generally speaking, malignant group narcissism finds symbolic satisfaction in the commonly shared ideology of superiority of one's group, and of the inferiority of all others. ' "We" are admirable; "they" are despicable. "We" are good; "they" are evil' (Fromm, 1964: 82) . Notwithstanding that words themselves are deeds in that they bear the traces of the socio-spatial dichotomies they help moralize and perpetuate (see, for example, Bourdieu, 1991), the satisfaction of the narcissistic images This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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As long as the whites in Alabama or in South Africa [had] the power to demonstrate their superiority over the Negroes through social, economic, and political acts of discrimination, their narcissistic beliefs [had] some element of reality, and thus [bolstered] up the entire narcissistic thought-system. The same held true for the Nazis; there the physical destruction of all Jews had to serve as the proof of the superiority of the Aryans (for a sadist the fact that he can kill a man proves that the killer is superior). If, however, the narcissistically inflated group does not have available a minority which is sufficiently helpless to lend itself as an object for narcissistic satisfaction, the group's narcissism will easily lead to the wish for military conquests; this was the path of pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism before 1914. In both cases the respective nations were endowed with the role of being the "chosen nation", superior to all others, and hence justified in attacking those who did not accept their superiority. (Fromm, 1964: 86) Indeed, at least on the impalpable level of talionic emotions, the justification for waging ever-new wars is what we may now describe as a widespread sense of wounded narcissism. That the narcissistic person reacts with intense fury to criticism, and that 'only the destruction of the critic -or oneself -can save one from the threat to one's narcissistic security ' (ibid.: 75) , also applies to the narcissistic group. Disparagement of the symbols of group narcissism, from the flag and a territory to one's own God, emperor or leader, to what Douglas (1970 /2007 names 'natural symbols' (for example, race, blood and kinship), has often led to mass feelings of vengeance, which, in its turn, instigated further conflicts. 'The wounded narcissism can be healed only if the offender is crushed and thus the insult to one's narcissism is undone. Revenge, individual and national, is often based on wounded narcissism and on the need to "cure" the wound by the annihilation of the offender' (Fromm, 1964: 86-87) .
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Even if awareness ever allowed for any degree of guilt over one's own role in the creation of the problem in the first instance (call it terrorism, street crime, prostitution or what have you), or in the disproportionately harmful and, at any rate, inhumane treatment of 'wrongdoers', that guilt now quickly boils over, as if it has always been directed against false foes. The repression of guilt and the consequent consent to the continuation and increase of exclusionary behaviours are to be explained by reference not just to the high 'exit costs' (for example, potential material losses and the alleged riskiness of philanthropic alternatives), or to the sequential nature of the behaviour This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, in place, whereby the decision to dissent equals to confessing to one's own errors up to that point (see further Milgram, 1974 Milgram, /2004 . No doubt these are losses a narcissistic group feels too uncomfortable to stomach. But, when an ideology or what social psychologists term 'cover story' is present to justify a goal and the use of otherwise unacceptable means to bring that goal to completion, there is no need to assess alternatives, nor any past errors to be recognized, only guilty enemies to be corrected, if not exterminated. Throughout history, for instance, religious discourse has often served to support the power of cosmic rulers by preaching that obedience is a virtue and disobedience a vice. Christian teaching, writes Fromm, 'has interpreted Adam's disobedience as a deed which corrupted him and his seed so fundamentally that only the special acts of God's grace could save man from this corruption'. As a consequence, secular authority was resisted only by those 'who took seriously the biblical teachings of humility, brotherliness, and justice', only to risk being labelled and punished themselves as rebels and sinners against God. In a similar vein, the Protestantism of Luther claimed that 'nothing can be more poisonous, hurtful or devilish than a rebel' (Fromm, 1981: 46) . Still, one might wonder, do we really need to stretch the analysis so much? Is it not the case that, prior to its apparent emotive functions, narcissistic pathos assumes a vital biological role? If the individual did not attribute to himself an importance far greater than what he holds in storage for anybody else, 'from where would he take the energy and interest to defend himself against others, to work for his subsistence, to fight for his survival, to press his claims against those of others?' (Fromm, 1964: 72) . The aim of what Fromm terms 'reactive violence', for instance, is preventative, and more often than not consists in biological 'preservation, not destruction. It is not entirely the outcome of irrational passions, but to some extent of rational calculation; hence it also implies a certain proportionality between ends and means ' (ibid.: 25) . True as all this may be, antagonism to whatever lies outside the realm of the self also stands, paradoxically, in stark opposition to the very principle of survival. '[F] or the individual can survive only if he organises himself in groups; hardly anyone would be able to protect himself all alone against the dangers of nature, nor would he be able to do many kinds of work which can only be done in groups' (ibid.: 73). Survival, in this case, is inseparably tied to the vigour of the favoured group, be it the clan, an organization, the nation, a religion or even the state itself. So much soand here is a further paradox -that 'its members consider its importance as great or greater than that of their own lives, and, furthermore, that
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To answer these questions would require that we turn back to historicity, that is, enrich our perspective of subordinates and their very own psychic motives to obey displeasing commands with an intricate account of the ways in, and the broader cultural climate within, which such commands are communicated effectively by superiors. Space does not allow such an account here, only to mention that, for Fromm, particularly susceptible to authoritarianism are the lower middle classes. Classes, that is, with little, if any, foreseeable hope of upward socioeconomic mobility (Fromm, 1964) -or of socioeconomic stability and security, we may add. The 'psychological scarcity' so created, whether in physiological or ontological terms, compels man to hate, to envy or to submit (Fromm, 1949 (Fromm, /1986 ). The authoritarian character, then, is not to be confused with the rational actor of neoclassical economic theory. Whilst in rational activity 'the result corresponds to the motivation of an activity -one acts in order to attain a certain result', the strivings of the authoritarian character stem from 'a compulsion which has essentially a negative character: to escape an unbearable situation', and is so strong that the person is 'unable to choose a line of action that could be a 
This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, solution in any other but a fictitious sense ' (Fromm, 1941 ' (Fromm, /1994 original emphasis) . No wonder states lacking either the means or the will to provide adequately for the majority of the populace, or for large segments of it, often tend to pre-empt the spread of dissatisfaction and necessitate infantile attachment to their rule by cultivating a malignant type of narcissistic pride on a mass scale. Targeting weak or comparatively weaker out-groups serves to reaffirm power relations based on fear of force and to divert negative attention away from leaders and their role in generating or not resolving insecurities on the socioeconomic front, at the same time as providing the public with a concrete outlet onto which to transfer their anxieties, angers and complexes (Fromm, 1964; see further Cheliotis, 2008) . Apparently, it does not take much more than a gifted demagogic orator (or, at the very least, an extraordinarily arrogant man of action in a position of great power) and a millenarian rhetoric that, whilst promulgating the urgent need for reactionary or revengeful violence, subtly serves to plant the seeds of 'compensatory' destructiveness as well. This, explains Fromm, is the violence 'of those to whom life has denied the capacity for any positive expression of their specifically human powers. They need to destroy precisely because they are human, since being human means transcending thing-ness' (Fromm, 1964: 31) . The sadistic pleasure one finds in exerting complete mastery over another animate creature, often comes along with compensatory violence, whether this be committed individually or via identifying oneself with a powerful person or group. 'By this symbolic participation in another person's life [what Fromm, building on Freud's work, calls "transference" (see Fromm, 1962 Fromm, /2006 ], man has the illusion of acting, when in reality he only submits to, and becomes a part of, those who act' (Fromm, 1964: 31) . Sadism, in other words, is the flipside of masochism in the authoritarian character. 4 The unavoidable question is whether we can break the cycle of malignant narcissism. For one, Fromm argues, narcissistic cathexes are not innately destructive. It is therefore possible to divert them away from war and class struggle, away even from a shaky Hobbesian truce, and into a common normative commitment to human solidarity.
Life is elsewhere -but where? 5
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The revolutionary character is not a fanatic, either. Clinically speaking, the fanatic is an exceedingly narcissistic person, completely unrelated to the world outside. To shield himself against manifest psychosis, the fanatic has chosen and idolized a cause, political, religious or whatnot. '[B]y complete submission to his idol, he receives a passionate sense of life, a meaning of life; for in his submission he identifies himself with the idol, which he has inflated and made into an absolute'. Extremely cold and passionate at one and the same time, the fanatic resembles 'burning ice', he is close to what the prophets called an 'idol worshiper' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . Even those rare instances in which the fanatic actively disobeys irrational authority, are to be understood as expressions of submissiveness: whether as provocative acts 'intended to force the irrational authority to uphold and strengthen its control', or as attempts at 'turning away from one irrational authority in order to submit to another, more powerful one' (Funk, 1982: 94) . Similar arguments may be raised with respect to the person prone to adopt majoritarian attitudes in the name of majoritarianism alone (Fromm, This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Albeit a necessary ingredient of disobedience, however, courage is hardly enough. The very need for courageous conduct presupposes sufficient knowledge of the social functions of power, whilst the actualization of courage requires satisfactory apprehension of where power lies, the variable forms it takes (visible or invisible), the mechanisms it employs (for example, sanctions and rewards) and a realistic appraisal of the effectiveness thereof. The revolutionary character is not a 'dreamer'; that she holds a deep and genuine conviction does not blind her to the fact that 'power can kill you, compel you, and even pervert you' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . All things considered, the most fundamental trait of the revolutionary character is that she is free, independent and authentic, in the sense of being able to think, feel and decide for herself. Although not a cynic, the revolutionary character thinks and feels in a 'critical mood'. In her life, the practice of reflexivity amounts to an unrelenting occurrence -a banality, as it were. She is always alert to the possibility that fictions are made a hegemonic substitute for reality in the form of tradition, superstition, clichés or so-styled 'common sense', and that, in any case, deviation from the norms entails given perils (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . In this latter respect, the revolutionary character is aware that, just as the strength of power and the ineluctability of submission are liable to overestimation, due, for example, to such overt This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, exhibitions of pure force as staged military reviews, highly publicized nuclear weapons tests and the brutal suppression of dissidence (Wrong, 1979 (Wrong, /1988 , so they may be inordinately undermined by foolhardy comrades and manipulative political opportunists. It is not only courage that depends upon freedom of reason. The reverse is equally true. To evade the bonds of power, man needs to be willing to deal with the narcissistic dangers and burdens inherent to freedom of reason. Neutralization techniques do not behove. For example, one needs to accept any hitherto sublimated guilt for submission and even evildoing, the disconcerting prospect that enemies may be discovered amongst friends and allies, the endless nature of the newly started struggle, the label of cowardice for giving up, and the sheer chance of eventual failure and frustration (see, for example, Fromm, 1981) . The process of trying to resist power resembles the mythical encounter between Hercules and the beast Hydra: when one head is cut off, multiple heads grow in its place. We might say that the revolutionary character merges two variants of courage, the capacity to overcome fear of almighty power in practical terms with the ability to over-rule the psychological fear of positive freedom construed as the accomplishment of uniqueness and individuality. In a continuously dialectical fashion, the former requires the latter inasmuch as it helps sustain it. This is why, in the final analysis, the revolutionary character may only superficially direct disobedience against irrational authorities as such. 'Disobedience is not primarily an attitude directed against something, but for something: for man's capacity to see, to say what he sees, and to refuse to say what he does not see' (ibid.: 48; original emphasis).
Whilst often struggling on her own, and whilst freedom, independence and authenticity are the realization of individuality, as opposed simply to emancipation from external coercion, the revolutionary character does not live in isolation. ' [T] he growth of personality occurs in the process of being related to, and interested in, others and the world' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . The revolutionary character is not identified merely with the culture in which she happens to be born and raised, 'which is nothing but an accident of time and geography' (ibid.: 158). Thanks to her capacity to judge the accidental on the criteria of 'that which is not accidental (reason), in the norms which exist in and for the human race' (ibid.), she is identified with humanity as a whole. This relatedness is entirely different from 'dependence', 'heteronomous obedience' or 'ipso facto submission' to an alternative 'irrational authority' (Fromm, 1981: 19, 20) . 'The question is not really one of disobedience or obedience, but one of disobedience or obedience to what and to This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, whom' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . Obedience, if the term is to be used at all here, becomes 'autonomous', an act of affirmation rather than submission (Fromm, 1981: 19, 20) . Fromm also imputes positive value to the replacement of irrational authority with its rational equivalent, whereby 'the authority, whether it is held by a teacher or a captain of a ship giving orders in an emergency, acts in the name of reason which, being universal, I can accept without submitting' (ibid.: 21). Eventually, however, Fromm divorces rational thinking, self-liberation and revolutionary action from all claims deriving from an authority other than the endogenous authority of the self itself (see further Funk, 1982: 95-101) . A profusion of questions now need to be addressed. Is it not utopian to long for the day when humans will think and behave rationally, if their very nature is laden with narcissistic irrationality? Realistically speaking, how much rationality, if any, can they exercise? And is it at all possible to combine, by way of rationality, de facto desires with higher goods? Why would the exhorting and only promissory vision of all-inclusive equality under humanism prove more appealing than the comfortable orthodoxies of actualized distinctiveness? Lastly, is not to prescribe any higher good, humanism not excluded, an authoritarian act in its own right? Is not Fromm the humanist putting himself forward as a 'rational authority', a Platonic guardian of sorts?
On the abstract level of historical progression, Fromm argues for what he terms 'benign narcissism'. In the benign form, the object of narcissistic attachment is focused on achievement or, more precisely, on the effort so made by private individuals or groups. The finite end of having, in other words, matters less than the infinite struggle for being (Fromm, 1976 (Fromm, /1997 . Such 'being mode' is not to be confused with the lifework of Hannah Arendt's animal laborens, the armies of Eichmanns and Oppenheimers who view their work uncritically, as a mere end in itself. Nor is the 'being mode' akin to the lifework of the Arendtian alternative, the homo faber who judges material labour and practice only once the process is complete (see further Arendt, 1958 Arendt, /1998 . As Richard Sennett would argue, the 'being mode' is to be found at the meeting point between animal laborens and homo faber, there where 'thinking and feeling are contained within the process of making' (Sennett, 2008: 7) .
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This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, 'One who has learned to achieve cannot help acknowledging that others have achieved similar things in similar ways -even if his narcissism may persuade him that his own achievement is greater than that of others' (ibid.: 77). The dynamics of benign narcissism are, therefore, self-checking. An analogous case may be argued with regard to social or group narcissism. Here, too, one may hope, or, at the very least, hypothesize, that the collectivity may help individuals maintain a narcissistic equilibrium and direct their passion towards the actualization of progressive ideals and aims. For instance, '[i]f the object of group narcissism is an achievement . . . [t] he very need to achieve something creative makes it necessary to leave the closed circle of group solipsism and to be interested in the object it wants to achieve' (ibid.: 78).
Mindful of the Freudian maxim that attempting to impose quantitative controls upon the 'narcissistic core' is utterly futile, Fromm soon takes two crucial detours. For one, he decides to posit benign narcissism as subject solely to a prior qualitative change in the object of attachment. 'Even without reducing narcissistic energy in each person, the object could be changed', he writes (ibid.: 90; original emphasis). For such qualitative change remains contingent upon the existence of progressive authority structures, however, Fromm no longer situates the object of benign narcissism within the narrow ethical spheres of private individuals, the family, particular cohorts of the general population or localist political systems, nor within the glamour of their respective achievements. Man, Fromm now suggests, needs to free himself from 'the ties of blood and soil, from his mother and his father, from special loyalties to state, class, race, party, or religion' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . For, '[i] f the individual could experience himself primarily as a citizen of the world, and if he could feel pride in mankind and in its achievements, his narcissism would turn towards the human race as an object, rather than to its conflicting components' (Fromm, 1964: 90) . What is more, pride in the achievements of mankind would not exhaust itself to nostalgic retrospection; '[c]ommon tasks for all mankind are at hand: the joint fight against disease, against hunger, for the dissemination of knowledge and art through our means of communication amongst all peoples of the world' (ibid.: 91).
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This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, The crucial point here is that, if equality is a necessary prerequisite of solidarity, equality itself requires difference, not uniformity. Unless, then, one remains stubbornly attached to a relativism that leaves one vulnerable to abuses of power, Fromm's version of humanism may be said to offer criteria that are broad enough to guide our assessment of social developments without being pre-formative. In all, Fromm manages to navigate between the Scylla of 'moralism as egoistic universalism', whereby the formal recognition of humanity to all is not accompanied by reminders of the repressed economic and social conditions of access to the universal or by some form of political action aimed at universalizing these conditions in practice (Bourdieu, 2000 (Bourdieu, /2008 , and the Charybdis of authoritarianism in the sense of philosophical monism (Pietikainen, 2004) . Some additional comments by way of clarification and qualification need to be made on the concept of difference. Just as killing one's neighbour in the Kierkegaardian essentialist sense is more often than not the veil of totalitarian designs (for example, ethnic cleansing), so too is the This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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[T]olerance is first of all a form of charity. . . . Tolerance is always on the side of the 'reason of the strongest', where 'might is right'; it is a supplementary mark of sovereignty, the good face of sovereignty, which says to the other from its elevated position, I am letting you be, you are not insufferable, I am leaving you a place in my home, but do not forget that his is my home . . . In France, the phrase 'threshold of tolerance' was used to describe the limit beyond which it is no longer decent to ask a national community to welcome any more foreigners, immigrant workers, and the like. François Mitterrand once used this unfortunate expression as a self-justifying word of caution: beyond a certain number of foreigners or immigrants who do not share our nationality, our language, our culture, and our customs, a quasi-organic and unpreventable -in short, a natural -phenomenon of rejection can be expected. (Derrida, quoted in Borradori, 2003: 127-128) The Derridaean reverse of tolerance is pure hospitality, a notion reminiscent of Aristotle's eu zēn and closest to Fromm's idea of difference. 'Hospitality itself opens or is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invitation' (ibid.: 128-129; original emphasis). Fromm also divorces difference from the conditionalities inherent to relations of superiority or inferiority. As a matter of fact, he views the accentuation of difference, that is, the cultivation of the positive sides of individual peculiarities, as the foundation of a richer and broader human culture (Wilde, 2004) . This analytical leap allows Fromm to level one final criticism against the Freudian conceptualization of secondary narcissism, particularly against the 'almost mechanical alternative between ego-love and objectlove'. According to Freud, 'the more love I turn towards the outside world, the less love is left for myself, and vice versa'. Fromm's philosophical counterargument is this: '[i]f it is a virtue to love my neighbour as a human being, it must be a virtue -and not a vice -to love myself, since I am a human being, too. There is no concept of man in which I am not included' (Fromm, 1956 (Fromm, /2000 . What, on the level of practice, dispels the utilitarian dilemma of narcissistic love is that the This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Towards a conclusion?
Fromm believes that, just as human history began with an act of disobedience -Eve's decision to eat the fruit against the wish of God -, so too it may end with an act of blind obedience: 'the obedience of the men who push the button to the men who give the orders, and the obedience to ideas which make it possible to think in terms of such madness' (Fromm, 1955 (Fromm, /1992 . Such being the case, disobedience is more than an entitlement; it is a duty. Fromm is well aware that wishful theorizing does not suffice to give rise to the cognitive, psychological and moral bases of the socialist humanist world order he envisions. Whether or not malignant narcissism is 'so deeply ingrained in man that he will never overcome his "narcissistic core", as Freud thought' and whether or not there is 'any hope that narcissistic madness will not lead to the This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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This chapter addresses a theme that social sciences and philosophy have identified as central to the problem of knowledge and society, but lies underdeveloped in discourses of power and resistance. This theme reflects the hitherto camouflaged role of values in theoretical projects which developed notions of resistance. Whilst rationalist attempts to canonize solutions to social problems obscured local struggles and identities, postmodern and poststructuralist solutions to the problem of power fragmented the field of resistance's social compass embracing a form of cultural parochialism. Although insights gained by these approaches cannot be nullified, the limits to their proposals can hardly remain undisputed. What I intend to argue is that a possible channel of illuminating the discourse on resistance needs to rethink the problem of how values shape practices and theoretical models of resistance. The principal aim, therefore, is to highlight common concerns amongst theoretical schools which integrate the role of values in discourses of resistance and to rethink normative coalitions in the face of growing risks and contingencies that characterize the global situation today. In drawing affinities between diverse theoretical strands this chapter does not gloss over deviations amongst their standpoints, which can often affect decisively the final position endorsed. The point argued is that, despite these differences, the ethical core in those theories remains fundamentally the same, and the deviations can be understood properly, if placed at the required level of abstraction. The choice of presenting the argument in compressed form and through the voice of its various representatives serves largely pedagogic aims, keeping the discussion framed within the intellectual context of its articulation and development. However, what is offered in this essay is not limited to a mere review of particular theoretical positions. Rather, destruction of man before he has had a chance to become fully human' are pragmatic questions in need of answers as heads-on and concrete as possible (Fromm, 1964: 90) . How, then, to effectuate the idea of a universal human? Lilie Chouliaraki (2006) explains ex negativo that the highly sensationalized discourse of a universal humanity falls short. By virtue of its exclusive reliance on sensationalism, such discourse does very little to raise, let alone answer, the questions of why and what to do to eradicate destructive phenomena. It rather reinforces narcissistic sensibilities and practices, either by presuming that we -perpetrators, bystanders or unaware others -already possess a kind-heartedness in wait only for specific directions, or by framing victims as human only insofar as their stories reflect our own emotional world. Speaking ex positivo, the capacities of narcissists to become 'public figures' and connect to others depend on those technologies of the self that tap into their reflexivity in the sense of contemplation (Chouliaraki, 2006: 211) . For television mediation to perform this pedagogical function, for instance, it must '[combine] the emphasis on emotion -which facilitates the spectators' capacity to "connect" -with an element of impersonality, which interrupts rather than reproduces their narcissism' (ibid.: 212; see also Chouliaraki, this volume). Impersonality entails the use of deliberative genres of the media in ways that foreground the distinction between the spectacle and authentic reality, and between the act of watching and the appreciation of the need to undertake ethical action.
In various writings, Fromm takes up the challenge by offering a number of suggestions, some more utopian in their applicability and effectiveness than others. In The Heart of Man, Fromm argues that supranational organizations should establish symbols, holidays and festivals that would help change the object of narcissism to the image of human race and its achievements. 'Not the national holiday, but the "day of man" would become the highest holiday of the year' (Fromm, 1964: 91) . Concurrently, the focus of our educational effort should be to cultivate 'critical thought, objectivity, acceptance of reality, and a concept of truth which is subject to no fiat and is valid for every conceivable group' (ibid.: 92). The teaching of philosophy and anthropology, for example, would 'enable man to experience in himself all of humanity . . . the fact that he is a sinner and a saint, a child and an adult, a sane and an insane person, a man of the past and one of the future -that he carries within himself that which mankind has been and that which it will be' (ibid.: 93). History and geography textbooks, too, should be rewritten in ways that counter the distorted glorification of national accounts.
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Every now and then, true to his dictum that 'ideas do have an effect on man if the idea is lived by the one who teaches it; if it is personified by the teacher' (Fromm, 1981: 42) , Fromm himself left his private practice as a psychoanalyst to campaign actively against the Vietnam War, the Cold War, nuclear and biological armament, hunger and sickness in the Third World and much more. For 'man can be human only in a climate in which he can expect that he and his children will live to see the next year, and many more years to come ' (Fromm, 1964: 94; see further Wilde, 2004: 135-136) . Despite hardly ever seeing mankind reach any closer to its great potential for productivity, Fromm's sense of hope remained unscathed throughout. As he wrote in The Revolution of Hope -his pugnacious response to America's dehumanized situation in 1968 -, 'to hope means to be ready at every moment for that which is not yet born, and yet not become desperate if there is no birth in our lifetime ' (Fromm, 1968: 9) . Fromm's utopianism was, and is, the utopianism of the 'awake', of hard-headed realists who shed all illusions and fully appreciate the difficulties (Fromm, 1976 (Fromm, /1997 This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
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